Hungary: 5 key questions about the EU’s most important election of 2026

By Ketrin Jochecova and Max Griera - "Politico"

Get set for this year’s most consequential election in the EU.

Hungary’s campaign stepped up a gear this week, with populist nationalist Prime Minister Viktor Orbán facing the toughest challenge yet to his 15-year grip on power. The long-suffering opposition hopes that Péter Magyar — conservative leader of the opposition Tisza party, which is running 12 points ahead in the polls — can overturn what Orbán himself styles as Hungary’s “illiberal democracy.”

For many Hungarians, the election is a referendum on Orbán’s model. Under his leadership the government, led by Orbán’s Fidesz party, has tightened its grip on the media and state companies — sparking accusations of cronyism — while weakening judicial independence and passing legislation that sent Hungary plunging down transparency rankings. It now sits at the bottom of the World Justice Project’s rule-of-law index for EU countries.

The 62-year-old Orbán is the EU leader closest to Russian dictator Vladimir Putin and proves a continual obstacle to efforts by Brussels to build a united front against the Kremlin. He has repeatedly clashed with the EU on topics ranging from LGBTQ+ rights to migration. Predicting the end of the liberal multilateral order, Orbán kicked off the year by saying the EU would “fall apart on its own.”

But can Magyar — whose surname literally means “Hungarian” — really topple his former ally? And even if he does, how far could he realistically guide Hungary back toward liberal democracy with Orbán’s state architecture still in place?

POLITICO breaks down the five key questions as Hungary heads toward the seismic April 12 vote.

1. Why should I care?

Hungary may be relatively small, with a population of 9.6 million, but under Orbán’s leadership it has become one of the EU’s biggest headaches. He has long weaponized Budapest’s veto in Brussels to block Russia-related sanctions, tie up financial aid to Ukraine and repeatedly stall urgent EU decisions.

He is also a key — and sometimes leading — member of a group of right-wing populists in EU capitals, who unite on topics such as opposition to migration and skepticism toward arming Ukraine. Without Orbán, Czechia’s Andrej Babiš and Slovakia’s Robert Fico would cut far more isolated figures at summits of the European Council.

Brussels has often resorted to elaborate workarounds to bypass Hungary’s obstructionism, and Orbán’s persistent defiance has led to calls to ditch the unanimity rule that has been in place for decades.

“You have heard me 20 times regret, if not more, the attitude of Viktor Orbán, who, every time we had to move forward to help Ukraine … has used his veto to do more blackmail,” EU liberal party chief Valérie Hayer told journalists Tuesday.

2. What are the main battlegrounds?

Magyar accuses Orbán and Fidesz of nepotism and corruption — of weakening the country’s economy by favoring oligarchs — and of missing out on EU funds by antagonizing Brussels.

Orbán wants to frame his arch-nemesis Magyar as a puppet controlled by Brussels.

In the past year, Fidesz has launched public debates aiming to divide Magyar’s base — which spans green and left-wing voters to disenchanted former Orbán loyalists — on subjects such as the LGBTQ+ Pride ban.

Tisza’s strategy has been to avoid positioning itself on controversial issues, in an effort to garner an absolute majority that will grant the party power to reform electoral law, which they say Orbán rigged to his benefit, and enable constitutional changes.

Tisza’s No. 2, Zoltán Tarr, told POLITICO he expected Orbán’s government to deploy “all possible dirty tricks.”

“State propaganda smears, AI-generated fakes, doctored videos, potential staged incidents, blackmail, and exploiting the rigged electoral system. They will mobilize everything because they have so much to lose,” Tarr said.

Speaking at Fidesz’s party congress on Saturday, Orbán lambasted Tisza as a pro-EU stooge.

“If you vote for Tisza or DK [the social democratic Democratic Coalition], you are voting against your own future. Tisza and DK will carry out Brussels’ demands without batting an eyelid. Do not forget that Tisza’s boss is Herr Weber, Europe’s biggest warmonger,” Orbán said, referring to the German chief of the European People’s Party, Manfred Weber.

3. How and when does the election take place?

The national election will take place on Sunday, April 12. Voters will choose a new 199-seat National Assembly under Hungary’s mixed electoral system, with 106 MPs elected in single-member constituencies and 93 from national party lists.

POLITICO’s Poll of Polls shows Tisza leading with 49 percent support ahead of Fidesz at 37 percent — with Orbán’s party having been trailing for almost a year now.

Although the official campaign period begins Feb. 21, the race has effectively been in full swing for months.

Other notable parties in the race are the Democratic Coalition (DK); the far-right Mi Hazánk (Our Homeland) movement; and the satirical Hungarian Two-Tailed Dog Party (MKKP), largely created to mock Orbán’s policies. But these are fighting for survival as they may not meet the threshold of support for winning seats in parliament — meaning the Hungarian legislature could be exclusively controlled by two right-wing parties. 

4. Can the election be free and fair?

Challengers to the ruling party face a system designed to favor Fidesz. In 2011 Orbán’s government redrew electoral districts and overhauled the voting system to maximize its chances of winning seats.

“There is no direct interference with the act of voting itself, yet the broader competitive environment — both in terms of institutional rules and access to resources — tilts heavily in favor of the governing parties,” said political analyst Márton Bene at the TK Institute of Political Science in Budapest.

In addition to controlling roughly 80 percent of the media market, the government allows ethnic Hungarians in neighboring countries (who tend to favor Fidesz) to vote by mail, whereas those living abroad who have kept their Hungarian addresses must travel to embassies to cast their ballots.

“One side enjoys access to the full resources of the state, while the challenger receives no public campaign funding and has virtually no presence in state-controlled media,” said political scientist Rudolf Metz from the TK Institute, adding that this imbalance is partially offset in the digital sphere.

But even the unfair conditions don’t preclude a Magyar victory, Bene says, as long as the integrity of the voting process is preserved.

5. How much would a Magyar win really change?

The Brussels establishment is praying for Magyar to win, hoping a Tisza government will deepen ties with the EU.

Centrist chief Hayer said her party supported “any candidate who will carry pro-European values, who will be able to beat” the incumbent Hungarian prime minister.

Conservative boss Weber quickly welcomed Tisza into the center-right family to secure influence in Budapest and to give them resources to develop their electoral platform. He has repeatedly framed Magyar as the man who will save Hungary from Orbán.

While viewed as a potential bridge-builder for the strained Brussels-Budapest relationship, Magyar is by no means an unwavering EU cheerleader. He has been noncommittal about Brussels, considering that any rapprochement could be used by Orbán against him. In an interview with POLITICO in October 2024 he said “we certainly don’t believe in a European superstate.”

On the domestic front, Tarr — Tisza’s No. 2 — told POLITICO the party wants to “keep [the] border fence, oppose mandatory migration quotas and accelerated Ukraine accession, pursue peace, fight Russian propaganda, strengthen V4 [Hungary, Poland, Czechia and Slovakia] and Central Europe without being Europe’s bad boy.”

That echoes the prognosis of political scientist Metz, who said a victory by Magyar “would not mean a radical U-turn or a return to some idealized past.”

“Hungary’s role as the EU’s permanent disruptor would probably fade, not because national interests disappear, but because they would be pursued through negotiation and institutional engagement rather than constant veto politics and symbolic conflict,” Metz added.

Analysts also cautioned that change at home could be slow. Zoltán Vasali of Milton Friedman University said dismantling the current system would be “legally and institutionally challenging.”

“Core constitutional bodies will retain their mandates beyond the upcoming elections, and key positions remain held by individuals aligned with the current government, limiting near-term change,” Vasali said.

The scale of a Magyar victory could be decisive. A two-thirds parliamentary supermajority, which would allow the new government to change the constitution, Metz said, would be “a game-changer.”

“It would give a Magyar government the legal capacity to restore core elements of the rule of law, rebuild checks and balances, and introduce safeguards such as term limits for key offices,” he said.

Kinga Gál, Fidesz’s leader in the European Parliament, did not reply to a request for comment by the time of publication.

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(Ketrin Jochecova and Max Griera - "Politico")